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Abstract

Surface reasoning is defined to be deduction conducted in the surface language in terms of certain primitive logical relations. The surface language is
a spoken or written natural language (in this paper, English), in contrast to a
"base language" or "deep structure" sometimes hypothesized to explain natural
language phenomena. The primitive logical relations are inclusion, exclusion
and overlap between classes of entities.
A calculus for surface reasoning is presented. Then a model for reasoning
in this calculus is developed. The model is similar to but more general than
syllogistic. In this model, reasoning is represented as construction of fragments
(subposets) of lattices. Elements of the lattices are expressions denoting classes
of individuals. Strategies to streamline the reasoning process are described.
Criteria for strategy selection are proposed.
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1 Introduction

To make the notion of surface reasoning sufficiently precise,

two subordinate notions are needed. The surface language, used in relation to a natural language such as English, is the spoken or written language, in contrast to a "base
language" or "deep structure" sometimes hypothesized to explain natural language
phenomena. The primitive logical relations are taken to be inclusion, exclusion and
overlap between classes of entities. Surface reasoning is then defined to be deduction
conducted in the surface language, in terms of the primitive logical relations.
The position taken in this paper is that the primitive logical relations are the primitive
constructs of human reasoning, and moreover, that the surface language is adequate
to express and manipulate these constructs. Disparate logics and complex transformations linking them to the surface language are not necessary to explain language
understanding and reasoning. As the reasoning process becomes more complex, it
passes over into depth reasoning or logical analysis. The property that characterizes
surface reasoning, as opposed to depth reasoning, is its immediacy. Of course, given
the state of cognitive science, one can only press this position by persuasion. Some of
the persuasive arguments that can be marshaled rest on the following observations.
Inclusion, exclusion and overlap are primary, perhaps innate, spatial concepts. They
are exhibited in children's reasoning at an early age [4]. These relations are the basis
of the syllogistic (expressed by the categorical statements A, E and I, respectively).
They are also the basis of all intuitive systems such as Venn diagrams.

By definition a calculus for surface reasoning must be a direct representation of written
English. However it is desirable that the calculus employ a notation that is briefer
3

than written English. Syllogistic is such a calculus. But syllogistic is limited in scope
to monadic logic. A previous paper [6] introduced a polyadic logic which shares the
characteristics of syllogistic. The present paper investigates surface reasoning in the
context of this polyadic logic.
The principal results of this investigation are: development of a model of reasoning
similar to but more general than syllogistic; and definition of strategies to streamline
the reasoning process. Criteria for selection of reasoning strategies are proposed. The
criteria are based on syntactic features of the problem statement.
The paper is organized as follows. First an adequate calculus for surface reasoning
is presented. Next graphical domains are described in which the reasoning process
finds a natural representation. Reasoning is represented as construction of fragments
(subposets) of these domains. Finally, to facilitate these constructions, strategies are
defined which (i) impose global restrictions or preferences on the logical operations
to be used, and (ii) provide local guidance for the direction in which construction is
to proceed. A number of examples are presented to illustrate these strategies.
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2
IS

The calculus presented in this section

A calculus for surface reasonIng

.eN,

first described in [6].

The presentation given here follows [6] except that

the axiomatization given in [6] is replaced by theorem schemas and derived rules of
inference. This calculus is sound since it is based on theorems derived from a sound
axiomatization. This calculus is also complete since the previous axiomatization is
complete and since it can be derived from the theorem schemas and derived rules of

inference to be presented.
The objectives of the design of .eN are (i) structural similarity to English, in the sense
that well-translatable grammars [2] relating the two languages can be defined; and
(ii) syntax and semantics that bring the monotonicity principle into prominence. For
,more on these objectives, see [6].
The language of

.eN

does not have variables, individual constants or an identity

relation. The capabilities provided by these entities in conventional logic are provided
by singular predicates and predicate functors in
natural languages. Also like natural languages,

.eN.

In this regard,

.eN is similar to

.eN is implicitly many-sorted.

It can be shown [5] that the pure predicate calculus without identity (PP) is equivalent to a proper subset of £N, which in turn is equivalent to a proper subset of the
pure predicate calculus with identity (PPI). The deficit in expressiveness relative
to PPI is not significant, since singular predicates provide the essential capability
of the identity relation. However, the motivation for

.eN

is not to duplicate the ex-

pressiveness of PPI, but rather to provide a perspicuous medium in which to study
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those aspects of logic that play an important role in natural language understanding
and human reasoning in general.
2.1

Syntax

The alphabet of .eN consists of the following.

1. Predicate symbols P

= S U (UjEw Rj)

where R j

= {R1

: i E w}, S

= {Si

:i

E

w}, and S and the Rj are mutually disjoint.
2. Selection operators {(k1 , ... , kn )

:

n E (w - {O}), ki E (w - {O}), 1

~ i ~

n}.

3. Boolean operators nand -.

4. Parentheses ( and ).

.eN is

partitioned into sets of n-ary expressions for nEw. These sets are defined to

be the smallest satisfying the following conditions.

1. Each Si E S is a unary expression.
2. For all nEw, each

Ri E 'R

n

is a n-ary expression.

3. For each predicate symbol PEP of arity m, {k1 , ..• ,km}P is a n-ary expression
where n

= max(ki)l~i-5m.

4. If X is a n-ary expression then (X) is a n-ary expression.
5. If X is a m-ary expression and Y is a i-ary expression then (X n Y) is a n-ary
expression where n

= max(i, m).
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6. If X is a unary expression and Y is a (n

+ l)-ary

expression then (XY) is a

n-ary expreSSIon.

In the sequel, superscripts and parentheses are dropped whenever no confusion can
result. Metavariables are used as follows: S ranges over S; Rn ranges over R n; P
ranges over P; X, Y, Z, W, Y range over L,N; and X n , yn, zn, W n , yn range over nary expressions of £N. Applying subscripts to these symbols does not change their
ranges.

2.2

Semantics

An interpretation of

.eN

is a pair I = (V, F) where V is a

nonempty set and F is a mapping defined on P satisfying:

1. for each Si E S, F(Si)

Let a

= (d I , d2 , ..• )

in I (written I

= {(d)}

E '])U-' (a sequence of individuals). Then X E

= (k1 , . . . , km)P

3. X = Y and I
4. X

.eN

is satisfied by a

FaX) iff one of the following holds:

1. X E P with arity nand (d I

2. X

for some (not necessarily unique) d E 'D, and

=Y nZ

~a

and I

, . ..

,dn ) E F(X)

where PEP with arity m and (d k1 , · · . , dkm )

Y

Fa Y

and I

Fa Z

5. X = yl zn+l and for some d E V, (d)
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F yl

and (d)

F zn+l

FP

where I ~a X is an abbreviation for not(I
abbreviation for I

F(di

1

, ••• ,di

X is true in I (written I

F X)

,d1 ,d2 , ••• )

F X)

and (d il , ... , din)

X is an

x.

iff I

FaX for

r of sentences is satisfied in I

Abbreviations

every a E 1JW. X is valid (written

iff each X E

1. XUY:=

2. X

~

3. X

=Y

CXnY)

Y :=xnY
:=

(X

~ Y)

n (Y

~ X)

4. T:= (So ~ So)
5. XnXn- 1 ··· X1Y := (Xn(Xn- 1 ... (X1Y)···)
6. X1Y;

0

Y;-l

0··· 0

Y{ := ( ... (X1Y;)Y;_1) ... ~2)

7. AXly:= XIY

J!ln

:=

(n, ... , l}Rn

It is easy to see that:

1. I

FaX U Y

iff (I

r is true in I.

The following abbreviations are introduced to improve

readability.

8.

F

iff X is true in every interpretation of £N. A O-ary expression of LN is called

a sentence. A set

2.3

n

FaX)

Fa X

or I

Fa Y)
8

2. I

FaX ~ Y

3. I

FaX -

4. I

Fa T

5. I

Fa

where

6. I

2.4

iff (I

Fa X

implies I

Y iff (I

Fa X

iff I

for every I and

Xl Yn2
0

0 · · · 0 y;'2

Fa Y)

Fer Y)

Ci

iff for some d E V, (d)

F Xl

and (d)

F Yn2 0

· · · 0 y;'2

denotes composition of relations in I

Fa "Xly iff for all d E V,

(d)

F Xl

implies (d)

FY

Theorem schemas and derived rules of inference

Some definitions

are needed first. An occurrence of a subexpression Y in an expression W has positive
(negative) polarity if that occurrence of Y lies in the scope of an even (odd) number
of

operations in W.

An occurrence of a suhexpression ym, where m
is xym, Xym, or x(ym

n Zl),

~

1, is governed by X in W if W

or the complement of one of these expressions. An

occurrence of ym is governed by X n

...

Xl in W, where 1 ~ n

by X n in Wand that occurrence of ym is governed by X n -

~

m, if V is governed

l . . . Xl

in V.

A subexpression ym will be said to occur disjunctively in expression W iff (i) W

"Xn

··· "XlymUZ

where n ~ m; or (ii) W

= "Xn

··· "Xk +1 (Zl

UZ2 ) where 0

=

:s; k :s; n

and ym occurs disjunctively in Zl.

The universal closure of a n-ary expression X is the nullary expression (AT)n X. The
theorem schemas are the universal closures of the following.
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BTG. Every schema that can be obtained from a tautologous Boolean wff by uniform
substitution of metavariables of .eN for sentential variables,

n for 1\, and - for -,

81. 58
S2G. 4>[ Si nl

•• •

Sit Xfl, · · · ,Sink · · · Sit X;k /Pl' · · · ,Pk]

= Sin· . · Sit </>[X~l, · .. ,X:;k / PI, · .. ,Pk],

where 4> is obtained from a Boolean wff in sentential variables PI, .. · ,Pk by uniform substitution of

n for

A and - for -',

Xr

l

, •••

,X~k E L,N'

Sit,. · · ,Sin E S,

and n = max(nl' ... , nk)

IMAG. X1yn+l

DIST. (W n AXk
Xk

. · ·

T(X 1 n yn+l)
• ..

AX1Z 1) ~ W', where ym occurs disjunctively in W, governed by

Xl, k :::; 1 ~ m, and W' is obtained from W by replacing that occurrence

of ym with (Zl

n ym)

The rules of inference are the following.

EI. From (ZO

n SXl n Sin ... SitSyn+l),

where S does not occur in Xl, yn+l, or

ZO, and is distinct from Sit' ... , Sin' infer (ZO

n Sin · · · Sit Xl yn+l )

MON. Let ym occur in W with positive (respectively, negative) polarity. Let (AT)m(ym
Zl) (respectively, (AT)m(ZI ~ ym)), where 1 ~ m. Let W' be obtained from W
by (i) substituting Zl for that occurrence of ym, (ii) substituting (k 1 , ... , k1)
for selection operator (k l

, ...

,km ) on ym, if any, and (iii) eliminating all occur-

rences of governing subexpressions that no longer govern after the substitutions

10

~

in (i) and (ii). Finally, let T X for every governing subexpression X with an
occurrence of negative polarity that was eliminated in (iii). Then from (AT)hW
infer (AT)hIW' , where h and h' are the arities of Wand W', respectively.

Note that MON could as well be a theorem schema (similar to DIST) with modus
ponens providing for detachment. But MON embodies the monotonicity principle
and, to make this principle central in the calculus, is given the status of an inference
rule. Because of the importance of this principle, it is appropriate to elaborate on
the use of MONe
As an inference rule, MON provides a generalized detachment capabilitYe Also, subject to the conditions stated above, instances of the schema (AT)h(W ~ W') are
immediately deducible by applying MON to instances (AT)h(W ~ W) of BTGe The
use of BTG in this deduction will be implicit in subsequent discussione
It should be noted that an equivalent form of IMAG is AX 1 yn+l

AT(XI

~

yn+l).

This form of IMAG will also be used implicitly in connection with the application of

MON.
From previous definitions, it follows that if the expression AYX occurs with positive
(negative) polarity, then the occurrence of Y has negative (positive) polarity while the
occurrence of X has positive (negative) polarity; if the expression Y ~ X occurs with
positive (negative) polarity, then the occurrence of Y has negative (positive) polarity
while the occurrence of X has positive (negative) polarity; if the expression Y U X
occurs with positive (negative) polarity, then the occurrence of Y and the occurrence
11

of X both have positive (negative) polarity; and if the expression Y

X occurs with

either positive or negative polarity, then the occurrence of Y and the occurrence of X
both have positive and negative polarity. With these provisions, rule MON applies to
expressions containing occurrences of defined operators. In this connection, singular
predicates require special mention. Since "SX := SX

=SX

SX, any occurrence

of a singular predicate can be taken to have either positive or negative polarity.
In reasoning by refutation, it is convenient to replace EI with its contrapositive form:

EIC. From ZO n S·tn ... S·1
XIyn+1
infer ZO n SXI n S·In ... S·11 syn+l , where S does
1'
not occur in Xl, yn+l, or ZO, and is distinct from Si 1 ,

Let

r

~

.eN

WI, W 2 , ••

. ,

••• ,

be a set of sentences. A deduction of W from

Wn

=W

r

Sin

is a finite sequence

of sentences in which each W q is either (i) a member of

r,

(ii)

an instance of a theorem schema, or (iii) the result of EI or MON applied to elements
of the subsequence preceding W q • The notation

r r-

W will be used to abbreviate

the assertion that there exists a deduction of the sentence W from
abbreviate its denial. Similarly,

r

rEIC

TT iff

will

W will abbreviate the assertion that there

exists a deduction of the sentence W from

EIe. It is easy to see that r r

r; r If W

r

using the rules of inference MON and

r 1- EIG TT.
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3

A model of surface reasoning

Reasoning is viewed as theorem proving,

using either direct or indirect proof methodsa The objective of this section is to
develop a model for reasoning in .LN that resembles syllogistic (monadic) reasoning,
iae., reasoning about inclusion, exclusion, and overlap of classes of individuals. To
this end, a graphical domain is defined in which these relations can be naturally
represented. But first a standard form for problem statements is defined. It will be
assumed that

no = 0, iaea, that there are no nullary predicate symbols.

Any sentence of £N can be purified [7], that is, put in a form in which all quantifiers
have minimum scopea The procedure is well-known, using IMAG, DeMorgan's laws
(instances of BTG), and the following lemmas, which follow directly from DIST and
MON.

LEMMA

2 (schema) I\Xn

···

"Xl(yl n zm)

= ("X,··· "Xly' n"Xm ... "xlzm)J

where

n = max(l, m). 0

After purification, the prime subexpressions all have the form T( Zl

n

a

a

•

n Zg) or

AT(Vi U · . · U Vh ). Putting the result of purification in disjunctive normal form yields
a disjunction of expressions of the form T Xl

n ··· n T X k n I\T}l n ··· n "TYl, where

the Xi are conjunctions of prime subexpressions and the }j are disjunctions of prime
subexpressions. A set

r = {T Xl, ... ,TX k , I\T}l, ... ,,,TYl} of sentences comprising

such a disjunct, or a set of sentences equivalent to these under S2G and IMAG, will be
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called a standard form. Sentences of the form SX are ambiguous with regard to their

r.

position in

To remove this ambiguity, the convention will be adopted that SX is

always interpreted as /\SX or /\T(S ~ X). Obviously, any problem (i.e., finite set of
sentences) can be stated as a disjunction of standard forms. Indeed most problems
involved in natural language reasoning can be stated as a single standard form.

r+ =

The subset

{T Xl, . .. ,T Xk} will be called the positive part, and the subset

r _ = {/\TYi, . .. , I\TYi}

the negative part, of

r.

Often the positive part will consist of

a single element. The positive part represents a lower bound, LB, on the models of

r

in that at least the denotations of the Xi are asserted to be nonempty. Similarly the
negative part represents an upper bound, U B, on the models of

r in that at most the

denotations of the 1j are asserted to be nonempty. Therefore if

r

has a model, then

each Xi E LB must be nonempty and contained in each 1j E UB.
Let

r

~

£N be a consistent set of sentences. The relation

r

no confusion can result, is defined: Xl ~ ym :{:} f

n

= max(l, m).

It is easy to see that

defined X ~ Y :{:} (X C Y)
poset L r

n (Y

~

~

X), then

~

IXI and IYI

are

and

IYI

IX n YI

(I\T)n(X 1

~

~

when

ym), where
~

is

is a partial order on L,N /~. The
It can be shown (e.g., [1]) that

L r is a Boolean lattice with greatest and least elements

IXI

or simply

is a quasi-order on £N. Moreover, if

= (£N/~,~) is the Lindenbaum algebra off.

Further, if

~r,

ITTI

and

ITTI,

respectively.

are equivalence classes of £N/~, then the meet and join of
and

IX U YI, respectively, and the complement of IXI

The following properties of L r are easy to prove.
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is

IXI.

tTl = l{n)TI

(n}So

~

{n)So

Let £n ~ .LN be the set of n-ary expressions. Then Lr,n

=

(.cn/~, ~) is a sublattice

1. ITT} = IATTI =
2. ITTI = ITTI =

ITI =

where (n)T :=

l(n)TI

r r- Tn X n

4.

IX n I ~ ITTI

iff

5.

ITTI c IXnl

iff r

r- (AT)n X n

of L r for each nEw. From properties 1 and 2) Lr,n has the same greatest and least
elements as L r .
Define rank r : .eN ~ w as follows (cf.

1. r(P)

=

[8]).

0 for PEP

2. r((k1, ... ,km}P) = 0 for PEP

3. r(X) = r(X)
4.

r(X

n Y) = max(r(X), r(Y))

5. r(XY) = r(X) + r(Y) + 1

If

r is a set of expressions, then r(r)

the set of expressions of rank

:s;

:=

sup{r(X) : X E f}. Now let

d. It can easily be seen that L~d)

sublattice of L r for each dEw. In general, L~~
for each nEw and dEw.
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L(d) ~

.eN

be

= (r,<d) /~, C) is a

= (.c~d) /~,~) is a sublattice of L r

Reasoning can be considered a search of L r . The discussion to follow will emphasize
refutation, but the same principles hold for direct proof. If a standard form
inconsistent, then L r has only one element. Conversely, inconsistency of
established by proving that in L r ,

TX

E

r + and for some Y:

X !; (Y

ITTI = ITTI.

n Y).

r

r

is

can be

This would follow for example if

The search for such a Y is the essence of

reasoning by refutation. In general, it is not decidable whether such a Y exists (since

predicate logic is undecidable). Whether such a Y exists in the restricted lattice L~d)
is decidable. But even in this restricted domain the problem is NP-hard (since SAT
can be reduced to it). Therefore, some constraints must be imposed on the search. In
the following sections, two types of constraint will be discussed: (i) constraints that
require, or at least give preference to, certain theorems and inference rules to be used
in the search; and (ii) constraints that give preference to certain search paths.
By property 3 it is sufficient to restrict the search to Lr,l, since Lr,o is contradictory iff Lr,l is also. The relations between elements of Lr,l are inclusion, exclusion
and overlap, and thus search of Lr,l closely resembles syllogistic reasoning. From
properties 4 and 5, it follows that a standard form directly yields elements of Lr,l.

Let r(r)

= d. L~~l

is finite and therefore atomistic. The atoms of L~~l correspond to

the attributive constituents at depth d of Hintikka's distributive normal forms [3, 8].
Thus the atoms denote all the classes of individuals that can exist in the world entailed

by

r.

For these reasons, construction of a contradictory subposet of L~d{
, is proposed as a

16

model of indirect surface reasoning. Similarly, construction of a subposet of L~di
, which
exhibits the conclusion X

g TT is proposed as a model of direct surface reasoning.

17

4

Global strategies

This section presents strategies for simplifying proofs by

imposing global restrictions and preferences on the reasoning process a The strategies
are illustrated by examplesa Criteria for strategy selection are proposeda
Let

r

be a standard form which is to be shown inconsistent a

r

might represent the

whole or part of a logic problem, or it might represent a natural language discourse
with the denial of some conclusion from that discoursea To bring the presentation
closer to surface English, the following "syntactic sugar" is added to

.eN.

thing := T

noX 1 Y

:=

someXl Y

The illustrations of reasoning will be presented graphically as subposets of L~d~
, a Expressions of LN will represent their equivalence classes. In the graphical presentations,
to make polarity syntactically (and visually) explicit, no will not be used.
4.1

Breadth-first strategy

Meaning inclusion or entailment as it relates to

natural language understanding is often taken to be identical with logical entailment,
leading to the paradox of logical omniscience. Hintikka [3] suggests a way to avoid
this.

Whatever the meaning of a sentence is or may be, it seems to me
18

that the (literal) meaning of a (grammatically correct) sentence has to be
something that anyone who knows the language in question can effectively
find out. ... [Therefore] trivial implication seems to me a much better
explication of the idea of meaning inclusion than logical implication.

This insight has more than philosophical importance. Suppose
and r(f)

=

r is as described above

d. Trivial implication of the conclusion by the premises is indicated by

the trivial inconsistency of

r. r

is trivially inconsistent if a search restricted to L~~i

can produce a contradiction.

Generalizing this explication of meaning inclusion yields the following breadth-first
strategy. Initially the search is restricted to L~di.
, If this fails to produce a contradiction, the search is extended to L~tl). If this fails as well, the search is extended
to L~~t2), and so on, until a contradiction is found or some limit on resource use is
reached. Of course, as the reasoning process moves to L~d~i)
, for increasing i, it passes
from surface reasoning to depth reasoning.
This strategy can be used in conjunction with any other strategy. If a limit is not
imposed, it is a complete strategy.
4.2

Cancellation strategy

As a direct consequence of theorem schemas DIST

and BTG and inference rule MON, the following rule can be derived.

CANe. Let ym occur disjunctively in W, governed by Xk

* ••

Xl. Let W' be obtained

from W by deleting that occurrence of ym and all occurrences of "Xi that no

19

longer govern a subexpression. Let T Xi for every "Xi that was deleted. Then
infer ("T)h((W

n "Xk ·· · "x1 ym)

~ W'), where

h is the arity of W.

This rule, used in conjunction with rule MON, is very effective for a certain class of
problems. A well-known example is Schubert's Steamroller (see [6, 10] for details).
However, CANC and MON do not constitute a complete strategy. Therefore, the
cancellation strategy limits itself to giving preference to the use of this rule along with

rule MON (cf. the unit preference strategy [11]).
A simple illustration of the cancellation strategy is provided by the following example.

If Ben owns a donkey, then he feeds it. Every donkey that Harriet rides
is owned by Ben. Susie is a donkey and Harriet rides Susie. Therefore,
Ben feeds Susie.

In standard form,

r = {aIID(BO U BF), aIID(H R U BO), 3D, SHR}.

The relevant

subposet of L~~~ is shown in Figure 1. Inferences based on cancellation appear as
dotted arcs. The conclusion follows from S

~

BF. Notice that S

~

D immediately

implies (by MON) that S ~ (BO U BF) and S C (H R U BO). These inferences
correspond to unification in conventional logic. Subsequent cancellations correspond
to unit resolution. This example also illustrates direct reasoning.

4.3

Reasoning without CONY and EIC

If (k 1 , ••• , km ) and (11' ... , 1m ) are

distinct selection operators, then (k 1 , •.• , km)Rm and (1 1 , ... , Im)Rm will be called
variants of each other. A set

r of sentences in which no predicate symbol occurs with
20

two or more distinct selection operators will be said to be without variants.
Some problem statements do not involve variants. Others involve variants but the
variants can be eliminated. An example of noneliminable variants is:

Any transitive symmetric binary relation is reflexive.

with the standard form:

r = {(allthing)2(RoR ~ R), (allthing?(R - R), something(l, l)R}.

In those cases where the problem statement is without variants, it would seem that
CONY could have no essential role in a proof. Moreover, if variants do not occur in
the proof, it would seem also that EIC would not be required. This gives rise to the
following conjecture.

Let

r t- EIC

W where

a deduction of W from

r

U {W} is without variants. Then there exists

r which involves neither CONY nor EIC.

This matter will be considered further in a subsequent paper. It is remarked in passing
that if the conjecture were valid, the language LN without selection operators would
be completely axiomatized by BTG, 81, S2G, IMAG, DIST, and MON.
This conjecture motivates the following strategy, which will be called the instanti-

ation strategy. If the problem statement is not without variants, early use of EIC
and CONY is mandated wherever necessary to establish the connection between sentences involving distinct variants of the same predicate. If such predicates are already
governed by singular predicates, then only CONY need be used. Conversely, if the
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problem statement is without variants, then the use of EIC and CONY is prohibited.
The completeness of this strategy is dependent on the validity of the conjecture.
The next example, taken from Quine [7], illustrates the instantiation strategy.

All natives of Ajo have

a

cephalic index in excess of 96. All women

who have a cephalic index in excess of 96 have Pima blood. Therefore,
anyone whose mother is a native of Ajo has Pima blood. (The following
tacit assumptions are also made. Every mother is a woman. Everyone
whose mother has Pima blood also has Pima blood.)

The premises and denial of the conclusion are given by the standard form:
{aIIAC, all( W

r =

n C) P, some( someAM) P , all( somethingM) W, all( somePM) P}. If

the variant of M is not eliminated, it is necessary to use EIC to relate the sentences
involving M and

M.

The construction is shown in Figure 2. Heavy arcs represent

premises; dotted arcs show the two uses of EIC. Except for one use of CONV, the
lighter arcs represent inferences involving MON. Contradiction is evidenced by b ~

(P

n P).

An equivalent standard form without variants is: f'

= {alIAC, all(WnC)p, some(someAM)P,

allthing allW M,all(somePM)P}. The construction based on f' is given in Figure
3. Heavy and lighter arcs have the same significance. It must be pointed out that
this construction is no smaller and the variety of inferences no less than the previous
one. The advantage afforded by this strategy is that only a subset of the possible
inferences need be considered.
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Reasoning with MON only

4a4

Even when variants are eliminated, the con-

struction for the previous example remains complexa The complexity is due to the
sentence allthing allW M, i.e., "Of all things all non-women are non-mothersa" An
equivalent form, (allthing)2(M ~ W), iaea, "All who stand in the mother relation
are women," is less awkward. In the latter form one recognizes a property that is not

typical in natural language, viz., an inclusion relation between expressions of differing
arities. Sentences whose Boolean subexpressions involve only prime subexpressions
of the same arity will be called homogeneous. A set of homogeneous sentences will
also be called homogeneous. Where only homogeneous sentences are involved, MON
assumes the following simpler form.

MONH. Let ym occur in W with positive (respectively, negative) polarity. Let (I\T)m(ym

zm) (respectively, (I\T)m(zm

~

ym)). Let W' be obtained from W by substi-

tuting zm for that occurrence of ym. Then from (I\T)h W infer (I\T)h W', where

h is the arity of W.

Let

r

be a standard form.

If a subposet of L r is constructed using MON, but

not EI (or EIC) or any instance of a theorem schema except (I\T)h(W ~ W) and

I\XY

= I\T(X ~ V), then the construction will be said to involve MON only.

These considerations motivate the following simple strategy, called the monotone
strategYa Whenever the problem statement

r

is homogeneous and without variants,

give preference to inferences involving MONH only. This strategy is very effective for
a restricted class of problems, notably problems of the kind appropriate for Sommers'
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Term Calculus. Like the cancellation strategy, it is not complete and so is limited to
giving preference to reasoning with MONH only.
In many cases, a problem statement can be rephrased to be homogeneous and without
variants. The following is Sommers' [9] version of Quine's problem, which does just
this.

All natives of Ajo have a cephalic index in excess of 96. All women
who have a cephalic index greater than 96 have Pima blood. Therefore,
anyone Ajoan on both sides has Pima blood. (Tacit assumptions are as
follows. All descended from someone with Pima blood, have Pima blood.
Anyone who is Ajoan on both sides is a descendent of some woman Ajoan.
All cases of [the first statement] are cases of every woman Ajoan being a
woman with a cephalic index greater than 96.)

In standard form this problem can be given:

r = {aIIAC, all(WnC)p, some(someAB)P,

all( someP!J )P, all( someAB)some(W n A)!J}. The last tacit assumption, allAC ~

all(W

n A)(W n C), is redundant

since it is a valid sentence. The construction of a

contradictory subposet is shown in Figure 4. It involves MONH only.

4.5

Strategy selection

Four global strategies have been defined: breadth-

first, cancellation, instantiation, and monotone. They are not completely compatible.
What is wanted is a classification of standard forms by their syntactic properties that
correlates with the optimal strategy. Whether such a classification exists is an open
question. In its place the following approximate classification is proposed.
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1. The breadth-first strategy is indicated for all problems. It seems likely that for
natural language understanding d rarely exceeds 3. Therefore a limit of 3 or 4
on d would appear reasonable.
2. If the standard form contains sentences in which some subexpression has disjunctive occurrences of opposite polarities, the cancellation (preference) strategy
is indicated.
3. If the standard form is without variants, the instantiation strategy prohibits
inferences using CONY and EIC. Conversely, if the standard form is not without
variants, early use of EIC and CONY is indicated to relate sentences containing
different variants of the same predicate.

4. If the standard form is both homogeneous and without variants, the monotone
(preference) strategy is indicated.

A standard form may decompose into subsets, each belonging to a distinct class. In
this case, the subproblems are treated independently.
This classification is based partly on the conjecture given above, and partly on a
survey of problems, some of which were presented above. A more precise classification
is the objective of a subsequent investigation.
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Figure 2: Example of existential instantiation
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Figure 3: Previous example with variants eliminated

28

p

wnC

somePD

some(W n C)D

some(W n A)D

c

someAB

A

someABn P

Figure 4: Previous example reformulated
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5

A local strategy

The strategies of the previous section reduce the search

space to the point that, for simple problems such as those considered in this paper,
an exhaustive search is feasible. Nonetheless further economies are possible and in
more complex problems necessary. This section considers the use of pattern matching
in the subposet to guide the search for a contradiction.
The following example [7] introduces the strategy.

The guard searched all who entered the building except those who
were members of the firm. Some of Fiorecchio's men entered the building
unaccompanied by anyone else. The guard searched none of Fiorecchio's
men. Therefore, some of Fiorecchio's men were members of the firm.

A standard form for the problem for proof by refutation is:

r

== {all(noM A)S,

someF(noF A), noF S, noFM}. Figure 5 shows a partial construction. The elements
of

r

are represented by heavy arcs. The first inference is S C someM A, represented

by the lighter arc. At this point, the intersection of the two chains, one containing

someM A, and the other containing (someF A), focuses the construction. Because
these two elements lie on intersecting chains and have the potential (syntactically) to
produce complementary expressions, the search is directed to extension of either or
both of these chains. The two possibilities are shown as dotted arcs. Both result in
a contradiction.
The next example [9] illustrates a slightly different situation.
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All supporters of Nixon will vote for Reagan. Avery will vote for none
but a friend of Harriman. No friend of Khrushchev has Reagan for a

friend. Harriman is a friend of Khrushchev. Therefore, Avery will not
support Nixon.

A standard form resulting from direct translation of the premises and the denial of
the conclusion is:

r =

{all( N S)RV, all( AV)H F , no( K F)RF, H K F , AN S}. The

variants of predicates F and V can be eliminated to obtain the equivalent standard
form:

r' =

{R all(NS)~all(AV)HF,Rno(KF)F,HKF,ANS}.

Figure 6, based on f', shows the premises as heavy arcs and the first inference as
the lighter arc: all(NS)V C AV. This step connects the chains R ~ all(NS)V and

A V ~ H F and results in intersecting chains with elements some(!{ F)F and H F,
respectively. The syntactic patterns X F and Y F lead to a focusing of the search
to extensions of these chains. The two possible extensions are shown as dotted arcs.
Both yield contradictions.
The local strategy can now be defined as follows. As subposet construction proceeds
under the appropriate global strategies, the constituent chains are monitored for
the occurrence of a pair of chains having a nonempty intersection and containing
expressions of the form X Z and y Z, respectively. Expressions equivalent to these
forms also qualify.. The case in which one chain has zero length (i.e., both expressions
are on the same chain) is included~ Preference is then given to inferences that extend
these chains upward.
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Figure 5: A first example of guiding the search
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Conclusion

In the theory of reasoning presented in this paper, a problem

statement in standard form is modeled as a lattice of expressions, each denoting
a class of individuals.

The reasoning process is represented as construction of a

fragment of this lattice. Restriction of the reasoning process to unary expressions
and construction of a partially ordered subset are salient features of the theory. A
number of advantages follow.
First and most important, the reasoning process is similar to syllogistic, dealing with
classes and their relation by inclusion, exclusion and overlap. The monotonicity of
natural language quantifiers, which is the basis of syllogistic, is the unifying principle
of surface reasoning, embodied in inference rule MON. The simplicity and directness
of surface reasoning is a result. Where the problem statement is homogeneous and
without variants rule MON alone usually suffices. Reasoning in such cases is virtually
identical to syllogistic reasoning.
Second, the local strategy, which guides the search for a contradiction by syntactic
pattern matching, is based on an explicit order. Patterns exhibited by expressions of
the subposet can be interpreted only in the context of the partial order; while several
pairs of expressions may have the syntactic potential to produce a complementary
pair, only those that lie on intersecting chains can produce a contradiction.
Third, the partial order provides a subsumption relation on the classes of individuals
(called sorts in conventional logic). This subsumption relation allows MON to unify
expressions without processing variables and in particular without an "occur check."
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In the cancellation strategy., which corresponds to the unit resolution strategy of
conventional logic, unification is provided by MON with resolution performed by

CANC.

A reasoning procedure is a calculus together with an algorithm to control deduction
in the calculus. £N has been proposed [6] as an appropriate calculus. The model
presented in this paper, together with the strategies for efficient construction of model
fragments, constitutes an operational definition of an appropriate control algorithm.
It is argued that this reasoning procedure models important aspects of human reasoning. While no definite conclusion is possible on this issue, it is clear that this reasoning
procedure can be automated. The means for input and output can be based on the
direct intertranslatability of

.eN

and English, which facilitates construction of stan-

dard forms for problem statements as well as reporting of the reasoning process in
English. Such an automated reasoning system would permit more definite conclusions
regarding its success in emulating human understanding of natural language.
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